Kurdistan

Labour and migrant workers

What we found

Variation
Migrant women in Kurdistan work in a variety of sectors and have a range of skills. Many work in households, hospitality, education (international schools and universities), beauty, NGOs, and business and have migrated from North America, Europe, Africa, South Asia and neighbouring countries in the Middle-East. South-South migration includes both highly educated and skilled women (Iran, Pakistan, South Africa, Syria), as well as less skilled waitresses and domestic workers (Ghana, Indonesia).

There are very different regulations of work. Service workers are regulated under the kafala system with a guarantor, while skilled workers have contracts with their employers. Refugees from neighbouring countries have the right to work granted by the KRI government. Among migrant domestic workers, salaries vary according to nationality with Filipinas receiving the most and African women the least. However, in general the women are satisfied with their income.

Challenges
There is a lack of overall protection for service workers. Regulation No 2 on Foreign Workers has not been updated since its inception in 2015, and does not take into account new issues such as COVID-19. Its impact varies according to type of work with many professionals in education and NGOs able to work online but leaving those in hospitality without work or income. Migrant domestic workers continue work but are often expected to do so even if ill. Professionals know their contract and how to raise issues; whereas some service workers have not received their contracts or know how to challenge their working conditions.

Sexual Harassment is a major challenge.  Many of the women in this study complained about sexual harassment on public transport, especially taxis, and other public spaces, limiting their mobility and safety across the city.

Migration and displacement

What we found
The Kurdish diaspora results from multiple and recurrent strategies of state-led demographic engineering and displacement to which the Kurdish communities in each of the four states (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria) have been subjected. The Kurdish diaspora that began in the 1980s continued so that currently the Kurds not only constitute one of the largest stateless nations in the world, but also one of the largest diaspora communities.

There is little comprehensive statistical data on the Kurdish population in Europe and existing data is conflated and confused because European countries register migrants according to their nationality, not their ethnic affiliations and therefore Kurds remain registered as ‘Turkish’, ‘Iranian’, ‘Iraqi’ and ‘Syrian’ when they arrive in Europe. This policy has not only subsumed Kurdish identity under an ethnic categorisation that does not distinguish Kurds from other minority ethnic groups, but it also imposes upon them an unacceptable national identity that most have spent their lives opposing.

Based on our fieldwork and a growing body of literature, we argue that the conflict generated Kurdish diaspora can be seen as a politicised, plural, and hybrid formation that has been shaped not only by the fundamental experience of statelessness, violence, and displacement in the country of origin but also by opportunities and difficulties in the Europe.

The emergent Kurdish diaspora is no longer a community of refugees. There are significant Kurdish professions and companies in Germany, Great Britain and Sweden. The Kurdistan Regional Government can benefit from the diaspora’s unique ideas, skills and resources to persuade them to invest economically and culturally in conflict affected Kurdistan. This could support Kurdistan’s economic diversification and help build transnational networks, strengthen ties between sending and receiving countries, and directly contribute to development efforts.